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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
WHEN COUNSELING Is NOT ENOUGH: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REQUIRES EMPLOYERS TO DISCIPLINE SEXUAL HARASSERS
Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1992).
With more men and women working side-by-side than ever before, the
modem workplace increasingly has become a source of both welcome
romances I and unwelcome sexual harassment.2 Employers who do not
recognize the difference between the two potentially face liability under
Title V11 3 for their employees' sexual harassment.4  In fact, the Ninth
1. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. Rav. 777, 854 (1988) ("The increasing importance of work has meant that, for many peo-
ple, there is no longer a sharp distinction between their social life and their working life."); Ellen
Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 333, 357 (1990) ("Office romances are commonplace, especially now that women increasingly
populate the workforce.").
2. See BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 47-48 (1985) (acknowledging that
fifty-three percent of working women have encountered sexual harassment). Clarence Thomas' con-
firmation hearings have produced a greater awareness of sexual harassment. In 1992, approximately
10,552 people filed complaints of sexual harassment with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, a significant increase from the 6,883 people who filed complaints in 1991. Nancy E. Ro-
man, Harassment Headlines Help Muddy Definition of Crime, THE WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at
A6.
3. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
There is no legislative history to guide courts in determining what is "sex" discrimination. The
word "sex" was added to Title VII at the last minute in an effort to defeat the entire Civil Rights
Act. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Smith, Green, Tuten, Andrews, and
Rivers); See generally Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
431, 441-42 (1966).
In 1980 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) established Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex [hereinafter "Guidelines"] which declared that sexual harassment
violates section 703 (a)(l) of Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992). The definition of sexual harass-
ment in the Guidelines states:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
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Circuit recently decreed that employers who discover hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment must do more than simply counsel an employee
if the employee continues the harassment.
In Intlekofer v. Turnage,5 the Ninth Circuit held the Veteran's Admin-
istration (VA) liable under Title VII for failing to discipline an employee
after repeated counselling sessions with the employee did not end the
sexual harassment.6 The court accepted, but did not address, the district
court's finding that the employee's behavior, while "not overtly sexual,"7
constituted hostile environment sexual harassment.' The court, how-
ever, reversed the district court's ruling that the VA had responded
promptly and reasonably to the complaints.9
This Recent Development addresses the standard that emerges from
Intlekofer for employer liability under Title VII 1° for co-worker,"1 hos-
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992). The Supreme Court upheld the determination that sexual harass-
ment violates Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See infra notes 13-34
and accompanying text.
4. Title VII does not require an asexual workplace. Only "unwelcome" sexual conduct that
affects a term or condition of employment is prohibited. E.E.O.C. Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615
T3114, at 3267 (1990). Employers often find distinguishing between legitimate and wrongful sexual
conduct difficult. See, eg., Paul, supra note 1, at 358.
5. 973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992).
6. 973 F.2d at 779.
7. The proper inquiry under Title VII is whether the behavior would have occurred but for the
plaintiff's sex. The behavior does not need to be "overtly sexual." Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842
F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988); Boyd v. Hayes Living Health Care Agency, 671 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.
Tenn, 1987).
8. 973 F.2d at 779 n.7. Judge Hall argued that because the VA did not appeal the finding, it
was not properly before the court. Id. Judge Keep agreed. Id. at 781. Judge Wiggins did not
believe that sexual harassment had occurred, but admitted that the court may be required to accept
the finding because it was not appealed. Id. at 783.
9. Id. at 779. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a calculation of damages, attorney's
fees and costs. Because the plaintiff prevailed on appeal, the court granted her request for attorney's
fees under section 706(k) of Title VII. Id. at 781 n.10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-5)(k).
10. This Recent Development addresses only an employer's liability under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. For proposals for, and discussion of, other theories of liability, see Tina Kir-
stein-Ezzel, Note, Eradicating Title VII Sexual Harassment by Recognizing an Employer's Duty to
Prohibit Sexual Harassment, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 383 (1991) (arguing that sexual harassment should
be included within an employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace); Paul, supra note I (proposing
tort remedy against harasser similar to intentional infliction of emotional distress); Terry M. Dwor-
kin, et al., Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 125 (1988).
11. The terms "co-worker" and "co-employee" are used interchangeably throughout this Re-
cent Development to refer to an employee who is not a supervisor of the victim.
Catherine MacKinnon defines sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual require-
ments in the context of a relationship of unequal power" in her ground-breaking book on sexual
harassment. CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN: A CASE OF DISCRIMI-
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tile environment sexual harassment.12 Part I discusses the key caselaw
leading up to the Intlekofer decision. Part II examines the unique facts
and three separate opinions in Intlekofer. Part III discusses the ques-
tions raised by the majority opinion and the impact Intlekofer may have
on employer responses to workplace relationships in the future.
I. CO-EMPLOYEE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Several courts have addressed co-employee hostile environment sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court acknowledged that such harassment is
capable of violating Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.3 In
Ellison v. Brady the Ninth Circuit expanded on Vinson by creating a
"reasonable woman standard" which measures whether such harassment
violates Title VII.14 In Ellison the Ninth Circuit also expounded on
other circuits' analysis by beginning to devise a framework for testing
remedial action by an employer." Sexual harassment that creates a hos-
tile work environment violates Title VII,16 whether or not such harass-
NATION 1 (1979). Ellen Paul criticizes MacKinnon's definition as not accurately reflecting the real-
ity of hostile environment sexual harassment between co-employees "unless one accepts the added,
debatable and more global assumption that males occupying any position in the workplace enjoy
more power than women." Paul, supra note 1, at 335. The E.E.O.C. and courts today recognize
that the conduct of employees with equal job power can create an abusive environment which consti-
tutes sexual harassment. In addition, in Cronin v. United Services Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922
(M.D. Ala. 1992), a federal court recognized a case of sexual harassment by a subordinate. This
Recent Development focuses on sexual harassment between employees of essentially equal power at
work.
12. The E.E.O.C. recognizes two forms of sexual harassment: (1) quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment, and (2) hostile environment sexual harassment. See E.E.O.C. Compliance Manual (CCH)
§ 615, 3114, at 3267 (1990). Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when the victim's submission
to unwelcome sexual conduct is made "a term or condition of an individual's employment," 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(1), or "is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting the individual."
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(2). Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual
conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(a)(3). For a discussion of the different standards of employer liability under the two types of sexual
harassment, see Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VIlfor Sexual Har-
assment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1987).
13. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See infra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
14. 924 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1991). See infra notes 35-60 and accompanying text.
15. Id. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
16. 477 U.S. at 66. Vinson was the first Supreme Court decision on sexual harassment. Sexual
harassment was first recognized as sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII in Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The first
case to recognize a "hostile environment" claim under Title VII was a race discrimination case.
Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
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ment leads to tangible economic injury.17 The Supreme Court, in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 8 adopted the 1980 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) Guidelines on Sexual Harass-
ment,19 and found that actionable sexual harassment consists of unwel-
come 2° sexual conduct 21 which is severe or pervasive enough to alter an
employment condition or create an abusive work environment.22
The threshold issue in Vinson was whether sexual harassment had oc-
curred. Vinson, a female bank employee, alleged that her supervisor had
sexually harassed her by repeatedly demanding sexual favors.23 The dis-
trict court found that no sexual harassment had occurred because if there
was a sexual relationship, it was voluntary.24 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed the district court.25 The Supreme
17. Drawing from the E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), the
Vinson Court found that sexual harassment violates Title VII "whether or not it is directly linked to
the grant or denial of an economic quidpro quo .. " 477 U.S. at 65. Circuit courts prior to Vinson
had come to the same conclusion. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Henson v.
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment); Bundy
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that continuous unwelcome sexual advances
without threat of adverse economic consequences constituted sexual harassment).
18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19. 477 U.S. at 65. The Court recognized that the E.E.O.C. Guidelines view harassment lead-
ing to non-economic injury as a possible violation of Title VII.
20. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). See infra notes 27-29, and accompanying text,
for a discussion of the "unwelcomeness" standard.
21. Actionable conduct includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)
(1985)).
22. 477 U.S. at 67. The Court stated that not all "harassment" rises to the level of Title VII.
Id. (quoting Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d at 238 (finding that the "mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" is insufficient to state a claim)). See
supra note 16.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case in which the litigants hope to determine
what severity of supervisory harassment rises to the level of Title VII liability. In Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.), cer granted, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993), the Court will decide
whether an employee whose boss repeatedly downgraded her must prove "serious psychological
injury" in order to recover under Title VII. See generally Linda P. Campbell, Court to Decide About
Sexual Harassing on Job, CM. TRn., Mar. 2, 1993, at N4.
23. 477 U.S. at 60. The plaintiff brought the charges after being fired from her position as a
bank teller for taking excessive sick leave. Id. She claimed that shortly after becoming a teller her
supervisor took her to dinner and suggested that they have sexual relations. Id. At first she refused,
but, out of fear of losing her job, she agreed to the sexual relations. Id. Over the next several years,
the supervisor made passes and touched her in front of employees, exposed himself to her, followed
her into the ladies' room, had intercourse with her, and even raped her on numerous occasions. Id.
24. Id. at 61 (citing Vinson v. Taylor, 22 EPD 30,708, p.14, 392, 23 FEP Cases 37, 42 (D.C.
1980)).
25. Id. at 62.
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Court affirmed the court of appeals.26 The Court held that the proper
inquiry was not whether the sexual conduct was "voluntary," but
whether it was "unwelcome." '27 The Court directed the trier of fact to
look at the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether or not
the conduct was unwelcome.28 Consequently, an inquiry into the plain-
tiff's sexually provocative speech, dress, or personal fantasies could be
relevant even though consent or voluntariness is not a defense to a sexual
harassment charge brought under Title VII. 29
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. 1604.1 l(a) (1985)). The Court observed that simply because the
sexual conduct is "voluntary," in the sense of consent, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit
brought under Title VII. Id.
28. 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)). Lower courts applying the Vinson
welcomeness standard have reached differing results. Compare Swentek v. USAir, 830 F.2d 552, 557
(4th Cir. 1987) (noting that plaintiff's use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting
does not waive [her claim].") with Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meriden, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D.
Miss. 1986) (finding that the plaintiff's use of foul language and sexual jokes contributed to the
offensive environment and that ceasing the activity was insufficient to show unwelcomeness.), aff'd,
824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
29. 477 U.S. at 69. Although, the Fourth Circuit had determined that such evidence "had no
place in this litigation," the Court found that the evidence could not be ruled irrelevant as a matter
of law. Id.
Some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's reliance on the victim's dress and sexual
fantasies to determine welcomeness. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 826
(1991); Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 751, 770 (1989) CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); Wendy Pol-
lack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience v. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 58
(1990); Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor
Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 469 (1987).
Susan Estrich compares the "unwelcomeness" standard to the former "consent and resistance"
evidentiary standards in rape law. Estrich, supra, at 826-27. According to Estrich, the welcomeness
standard is subject to the same abuses as an inquiry into a rape victim's dress or sexual history. She
argues: "Given the additional prerequisites for establishing sexual harassment ... the unwelcome-
ness requirement is unnecessary even as a means to protect what some would consider legitimate,
consensual sex in the workplace." Id. However, Estrich's criticisms are made in the context of
Vinson, where the perpetrator was a supervisor. She argues that Rehnquist's comments on the wel-
comeness standard, like the district court's reliance on "voluntariness," ignore the supervisory posi-
tion of the harasser.
Estrich's criticisms are less tenable in the context of a sexual relationship between co-employees.
Where both the plaintiff and the alleged harasser are non-supervisory employees, the danger that a
relationship may be "voluntary" but not "welcome" is substantially less. The plaintiff would be less
fearful of losing job benefits by not entering the relationship. Inquiry into how the plaintiff demon-
strated that the alleged harasser's conduct was unwelcome becomes even more relevant.
Furthermore, differences between sexual harassment and criminal rape may justify greater scru-
tiny of the sexual harassment victim's actions. In one case the victim is a party seeking damages and
in the other the victim is not even a party. The burden of proof is already easier for a civil plaintiff
than for the state in a criminal rape case. Therefore, it may be necessary to require the civil plaintiff
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Vinson Court refused to go beyond recognizing a cause of action
and formulate a definite rule regarding employer liability for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment by supervisors. 30 The Court agreed with the
E.E.O.C. that Congress intended general agency principles to guide ad-
dressing supervisor liability issues.3"
The Vinson Court did not address employer liability for a non-supervi-
sory co-worker's sexual harassment because Vinson involved sexual har-
assment by a supervisor.32 Since Vinson, most courts have adopted the
E.E.O.C.'s constructive notice standard for both supervisor and non-su-
pervisor liability.33 Under the constructive notice standard, employers
are liable for co-worker sexual harassment if they knew or should have
known of the harassing conduct, unless they took prompt and appropri-
ate remedial action.34
The Ninth Circuit addressed Title VII liability for co-worker hostile
environment sexual harassment in Ellison v. Brady.35 Ellison addressed
two issues: (1) what constitutes "severe and pervasive" sexual harass-
seeking damages to prove "unwelcomeness" in light of her actions, in order to protect against false
claims.
30. 477 U.S. at 72. For a discussion of the positions of each of the parties, the E.E.O.C., the
lower courts, and the Vinson Court, see Anderson, supra note 12, at 1265-75.
31. 477 U.S. at 72. In its amicus brief, the E.E.O.C. distinguished between quid pro quo and
hostile environment claims. It argued that in a quid pro quo claim, employers are liable for their
supervisors' actions, because when a supervisor makes an employment decision based on submission
to sexual conduct, the supervisor is acting under the express or apparent authority of the employer.
The employer is liable whether or not the employer had actual or constructive knowledge. In the
hostile environment claim, on the other hand, the E.E.O.C. argued that liability should depend on
whether the employer had enacted a policy against sexual harassment which provided an accessible
means for the plaintiff to bring her dispute. Id. at 70-71 (citing United States and E.E.O.C. amicus
curiae brief). This aspect of the E.E.O.C. brief differed from its 1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harass-
ment, which made an employer liable for the acts of its supervisors regardless of the type of claim.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(c). As Katherine S. Anderson argues, apparently the E.E.O.C. believes "a
supervisor is not acting within his delegated authority when he creates an offensive work environ-
ment." Anderson, supra note 12, at 1268.
32. Relationships involving supervisors enter the "murky area where power and caring con-
verge" which Catherine MacKinnon calls "coerced caring." MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 54.
But finding sexual harassment in relationships not involving supervisors can be still more difficult.
As one commentator observed, "[w]hen no significant disparity in power exists between the parties
in the sexual relationship ... the likelihood of both sexual harassment and favoritism declines."
Chamallas, supra note 1, at 856.
33. !-g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991); Sapp v. City of Warner Robins, 655 F.Supp. 1043, 1049 (M.D.
Ga. 1987); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3rd Cir. 1990).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1990).
35. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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ment necessary to support such a claim; and, (2) what constitutes an
"immediate and appropriate" employer response.36 Addressing the first
issue, the court held that the alleged sexual harassment should be evalu-
ated from the perspective of the "reasonable woman."'37 Addressing the
second issue, the court held that an employer must take action reason-
ably calculated to end the harassment.38
In Ellison, the plaintiff, Kerry Ellison, alleged that Sterling Gray, a
male co-worker at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in San Mateo, Cal-
ifornia, harassed her with unwelcome sexual propositions. Gray loitered
unnecessarily at Ellison's desk, constantly asked Ellison trivial questions,
and invited Ellison out to lunch despite her persistent refusals. 39 When
Ellison refused Gray's invitations, Gray handed Ellison a bizarre note
expressing his dismay." Ellison showed the note to her supervisor. The
supervisor agreed that it was sexual harassment. Ellison, however, asked
her supervisor not to take any action.41 The next week, while out of
town for training, Ellison received a second, even more strange, and sex-
ually-conative letter.42 She immediately telephoned her supervisor and
36. The Ninth Circuit first addressed which remedial actions can shield an employer from Title
VII liability in Ellison. Id. at 881.
37. 924 F.2d at 879. The court acknowledged that if a man brings a claim for sexual harass-
ment, the perspective would be that of a "reasonable man." Id. at 879 n. 11. But cf Hannah v.
Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 9 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that a
reasonable man could not be offended by coarse language on the job).
The court's "reasonable woman" standard has been widely discussed. See, eg., Stuart L. Bass,
The "Reasonable Woman" Standard: The Ninth Circuit Decrees Sexes Perceive Differently, 1992
LABOR L.J. (July) 449 (1992); David I. Gedrose, Note, Workplace Sexual Harassment: The Ninth
Circuit's Reasonable Woman Standard and Employer Remedial Actions In Hostile Environment
Claims Following Ellison v. Brady, 28 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 151 (1991); Lynne A. Reinders, Note
A Reasonable Woman Approach to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), 41 J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 228 (1992).
38. Id. at 881.
39. 924 F.2d at 873. Before the harassment began, on a day when no one else was in the office,
Gray and Ellison had gone to lunch together. Gray had to pick up his son's forgotten lunch, so he
gave Ellison a tour of his house. After this, the harassment began. Ellison refused to go to lunch
alone with Gray ever again. Once Gray even reported to work dressed in a three-piece suit and
asked Ellison to lunch to no avail. Id. at 873-74.
40. Id. at 874. The note read: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I
have never been in such term oil (sic). Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your
hatred for another day." Id.
41. Id. Ellison wanted to handle the harassment on her own. Ellison asked a male co-worker
to tell Gray to leave her alone.
42. Id. The second letter read in part:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex.... Leaving aside the hassles and
disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watch-
ing you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away. Admiring your style and elan.... Don't
Washington University Open Scholarship
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expressed her shock and fear.4 3 Her supervisor counseled Gray and re-
peatedly reminded him not to contact Ellison. Gray was transferred to
San Francisco just prior to Ellison's return from training. After only
three weeks in San Francisco, Gray filed a union grievance seeking to
return to San Mateo. The IRS agreed to allow him to return, provided
he did not disturb Ellison. Ellison subsequently fied a formal complaint
and obtained a temporary transfer to San Francisco.'
The Ninth Circuit admitted that under the traditional "reasonable per-
son" standard, Gray's actions could appear as nothing more than the
well-intentioned appeals of a "modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac." 45 But
the court found that even well-intentioned conduct may be sexual harass-
ment. 46 The court argued that men and women perceive things differ-
ently.47 What may seem harmless to a man may be offensive to a
woman. 48 Women have greater reason to fear conduct such as Gray's
you think it odd that two people who have never even talked together, alone, are striking
off such intense sparks .... I will [write] another letter in the near future.
924 F.2d at 874.
43. Id. Ellison testified: "I just thought he was crazy. I thought he was nuts. I didn't know
what he would do next. I was frightened." Id.
44. Id. Gray wrote another letter to Ellison while she was in San Francisco in which he sug-
gested that they had a relationship. Id.
The IRS investigator responding to Ellison's complaint agreed that Gray's action constituted sex-
ual harassment. However, the Treasury Department rejected the claim, arguing that the conduct
did not rise to the level of pattern behavior covered by the E.E.O.C. guidelines. The E.E.O.C. found
that the IRS had taken appropriate action and affirmed the Treasury Department's decision. 924
F.2d at 875.
45. 924 F.2d at 880. The court stated that "[e]xamined in this light, it is not difficult to see why
the district court characterized Gray's conduct as isolated and trivial." Id.
46. 924 F.2d at 880. See also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (Ist Cir.
1988).
47. Id. at 878. As one commentator argues:
The controversy generated by Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment ... drama-
tize[s] the problem caused by differing perceptions from men and women as to what consti-
tutes offensive conduct. In general, men have expressed confusion, while women exhibit
indignation over what they perceive as the insensitivity of men.
Nell J. Medlin, Note, Expanding the Law of Sexual Harassment to Include Workplace Pornography:
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 21 STETSON L. REV. 655, 675 n. 119 (1992).
See also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987).
48. The reasonable woman standard has produced a split among feminists. Many were arguing
for its adoption before the Ellison case. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Trans-
formation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989); Nancy S. Ehrereich, Pluralistic
Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology ofReasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J,
1177 (1990). However, some argue that the reasonable woman standard is a setback for feminism
because it trivializes the injury and implies women are not reasonable persons. See Kathleen A.
Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAB. LAW. 203, 204-06
(1992); Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience v, Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
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because they are more often the victims of sexual crimes.' Thus, the
court held that a female employee states a cause of action when she al-
leges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sexual harass-
ment. 50 A reasonable woman could conclude that Gray's conduct
constituted sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.
The court then addressed what remedial actions may shield an em-
ployer from liability for co-employee, hostile environment sexual harass-
ment.51 The court adopted the Fourth Circuit's requirement that the
employer must choose a remedy "reasonably calculated to end the har-
assment" 2 after the employer is notified of the harassment. The court
held that the proper inquiry is not what a "reasonable employer" would
do because a reasonable employer might be reluctant to punish certain
employees.53 Instead, the reasonableness of the employer's action, de-
pends on the action's ability to stop the harasser.54 The court also stated
that employers should "educate and sensitize" employees about appro-
priate workplace conduct.55 The education should enable the employees
to internalize proper attitudes toward workplace sexual conduct.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 83 (1990). Kenealy also argues that a male judiciary is likely to abuse a reason-
able woman standard by applying stereotypical norms of womanhood. Kenealy, supra, at 204. But
cf Medlin, supra note 47, at 677 (the reasonable woman standard is necessary because neutrality in
the male judiciary is an unrealistic ideal).
49. 924 F.2d at 879 n.10.
50. The court retained an objective "reasonableness" standard "[i]n order to shield employers
from having to accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee." 924
F.2d at 879. Cf. Sheryl Hahn, Note, Evolution of the Hostile Workplace Claim Under Title VII.
Only Sensitive Men Need Apply, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 69, 91 (1992) (goal of sensitizing
employees to the appropriate standard of behavior is balanced against the goal of ensuring employers
that they will not have to dismiss employees because of personality conflicts).
At least one commentator has argued for a "subjective" rather than "objective" standard in sexual
harassment law. See Eileen M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and
the Case for Subjectivity, 16 VT. L. REv. 1005 (1992). Blackwood argues:
If a woman suffers insult, indignity, and job discrimination because of her supervisor's or
co-worker's harassment of her as a woman, she should be compensated and the behavior
should be stopped. It does not matter whether she is particularly sensitive or insensitive.
Id. at 1024.
51. 924 F.2d at 881. Ellison was the first time the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)).
53. Id. at 882 n.17. But cf Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989)
(looking to "whether the employer's total response was reasonable under the circumstances as they
existed").
54. 924 F.2d at 882.
55. 924 F.2d at 880 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (1990)). See also Gedrose, supra note 37, at
163. Gedrose argues:
Employers who seek only to understand what the "law demands" will miss the point of
Ellison. After Ellison, employers shield themselves most effectively when they strive to
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The Ellison court refused to conclude that the IRS' response was rea-
sonable. The IRS told Gray to stop harassing Ellison, but Title VII re-
quires more. 6 Even though the harassment stopped while Gray was in
San Francisco, the IRS' decision to allow Gray to return was not reason-
able.57 Furthermore, granting Ellison's request for a transfer was not a
proper remedy because it essentially punished the victim.5 8
Although the Ellison court's adoption of the reasonable woman stan-
dard received much attention from commentators,59 the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of appropriate remedial measures left questions unanswered.'
After Ellison, whether an employer would be liable for failing to disci-
pline an alleged harasser was unclear.6 '
change attitudes about workplace sexual conduct, not when they attempt formal corrective
actions.
Id.
56. 924 F.2d at 882 ("Employers should impose sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free
from sexual harassment.").
57. Id. at 883. The court acknowledged that in some cases a harasser's mere presence may
create a hostile work environment. d. (citing Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106-107 (4th
Cir. 1989)). In such a case, an employer may be liable for failing to remove the harasser either by re-
scheduling work assignments or, in rare cases, by dismissal. Id.
In Ellison, Gray was allowed to return to San Mateo as part of a settlement with the union. 924
F.2d at 874. As David Gedrose points out, if a court, arbitrator or agency ordered an employer to
reinstate a discharged harasser, the employer's liability would be uncertain. See Gedrose, supra note
37, at 166.
The Supreme Court recently denied a petition for certiorari from a Seventh Circuit decision up-
holding an arbitrator's reinstatement of an alleged harasser. In Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union,
959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992), Chrysler immediately suspended and
then fired an employee who had grabbed the breasts of his co-worker. In a subsequent grievance
proceeding, the arbitrator ruled that Chrysler did not have just cause for firing the alleged harasser
and ordered his reinstatement. The Seventh Circuit upheld the arbitrator's ruling. But see
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992); Newsday Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1992) (finding that the arbitrator's order to reinstate a sexual harasser violated public policy).
58. 924 F.2d at 882 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615.4(a)(9)(iii), 1 3103, at
3213 (1988)). But cf. Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to rule
for the plaintiff on grounds that alleged harasser should have been transferred instead of plaintiff).
59. See supra note 37.
60. See Gedrose, supra note 37, at 166. ("[E]mployers may remain uncertain about the specific
remedial actions, beyond the general categories of 'prevention' and 'internalization,' necessary to
avoid liability.").
61. Caselaw from other circuits was also unclear. See generally Hope A. Comisky, "Prompt
and Effective Remedial Action?" What Must an Employer Do to Avoid Liability for "Hostile Work
Environment" Sexual Harassment?, 8 LAB. LAW. 181 (1992). Some courts held that a bona fide
investigation was enough to prevent liability. Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Barrett v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding
investigation and 90 day suspension sufficient); Sapp v. City of Warner Robins, 655 F. Supp. 1043
(M.D. Ga. 1987). However, some courts required more than an investigation or warning. Baker v.
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II. THE INTLEKOFER DECISION
In Intlekofer v. Turnage,62 the Ninth Circuit 63 held that an employer
would be liable under Title VII for failing to take more severe discipli-
nary measures after learning that counseling had not ended the sexual
harassment." The court reversed the district court's finding that the
Veteran's Administration (VA) had promptly and reasonably responded
to a case of sexual harassment.65
Between April 1987 and January 1988, Joyce Intlekofer filed ten sepa-
rate complaints with the VA management concerning the behavior of her
co-worker, Norman Cortez.6 6 The district court found that Intlekofer
and Cortez had been involved in an intimate, mutually desired sexual
relationship during the two years prior to 1987.67 Intlekofer's first com-
plaint alleged "touching" and pressure to enter an "unwanted relation-
ship." Her supervisor questioned her about the incident, but Intlekofer
refused to elaborate. 6 After the first complaint, the supervisor told Cor-
tez that he would be disciplined if there were additional complaints.69
The other nine complaints alleged a variety of incidents.70 Cortez
called Intlekofer at home, screamed at her in front of patients and co-
workers, monitored her telephone calls at work, watched which direction
she drove when she left work, and on one occasion chased her out of the
hospital.71 Intlekofer also filed a complaint against the Chief of Medical
Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th
Cir. 1989). Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), superseded by, 900 F.2d 27 (4th
Cir. 1990) demonstrates how far some courts required employers to go to shield themselves from
liability. In Paroline, the employer, upon learning of the harassment, denied the harasser security
access, delayed his promotion and pay increase, and warned him that a reoccurrence would result in
termination. However, the court found that the denial of security access actually increased the con-
tact between the plaintiff and the harasser, causing the plaintiff to resign. The court held that these
findings prevented a summary judgment for the employer.
62. 973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. A three-member panel comprised of Circuit Judges Hall and Wiggins, and Chief District
Judge Keep, sitting by designation, decided the case. Judges Hall and Keep, both women, wrote for
the majority, while Judge Wiggins, a man, dissented.
64. 973 F.2d at 779.
65. Id. at 781.
66. Id. at 775-76. Intlekofer and Cortez were non-supervisory co-workers at the VA Medical
Center.
67. Id. at 775, 784.
68. Id. at 775.
69. 973 F.2d at 775.
70. Id. at 775-76.
71. Id.
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Administrative Services, who allegedly met with Intlekofer and accused
her of "leading Cortez on."72 Three additional complaints alleged that
Cortez was talking to other employees about her.73 Throughout this
time, Cortez' supervisors periodically warned him that his actions could
lead to discipline.
In December 1987, Intlekofer filed an informal complaint with the
E.E.O.C.74 After reviewing the situation, the E.E.O.C. counselor recom-
mended four courses of action: (1) that Cortez obtain counseling; (2) that
Cortez and Intlekofer work different shifts; (3) that Cortez stop talking
about Intlekofer with other workers; and, (4) that both employees limit
their contact to business.75 The VA reluctantly instituted the last three
recommendations, but said that it did not have authority to require the
first.76 After the VA adopted the E.E.O.C. proposals, Intlekofer filed
three more complaints against Cortez.77 The VA continued to investigate
each complaint and to warn Cortez not to talk to or about Intlekofer.
However, despite threatening to take more severe disciplinary measures,
the VA never did.7"
Each of the three judges wrote separately in Intlekofer.79 Judge Hall
wrote the court's opinion. After deciding that the standards announced
72. Id.
73. Id. at 776. In one of these complaints, Intlekofer alleged that Cortez told another employee
that Intlekofer was "dumb." The final complaint alleged that Cortez continued to talk to other
employees about her. Inflekofer concluded that Cortez had ruined her reputation because other co-
workers had began asking her out. 973 F.2d at 775.
74. Id.
75. Id. Prior to making the recommendations, the E.E.O.C. counselor investigated the report
for two months. The E.E.O.C. counselor concluded that Intlekofer had been the victim of sexual
harassment. 973 F.2d at 775.
76. Id. The VA changed both Intlekofer's and Cortez' work schedules to have the least possible
overlap. Intlekofer testified that it would have been impossible to create a schedule in which both
employees were never on duty at the same time. Id. at 785 (Wiggens, J., dissenting).
77. 973 F.2d at 776. In February 1988, Intlekofer alleged that Cortez "throws keys at me, gives
me looks that could kill, and does not give any report as to what is happening at the hospital." Id.
In June and July 1988, Intlekofer filed reports stating, respectively, that Cortez had made an obscene
gesture at her in the parking lot, and that Cortez drew an obscene picture on her locker door. Id.
The obscene gesture was "the finger." The obscene picture was a portrayal of a dildo. Id. at 776
n.4.
78. Id. at 776.
79. The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's finding that the VA took prompt
and appropriate action. 973 F.2d at 777. The ruling was reviewed de novo because it required a
consideration of "legal concepts in the mix of fact and law." Id. (quoting United States v. McCon-
ney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). The appropriate-
ness of the employer's response was the only issue before the court because the VA did not appeal the
district court's finding of sexual harassment. Id. at 774 n. 1.
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in Ellison applied retroactively,"° the court held that the VA did not take
action that was likely to end the harassment.81 While the VA repeatedly
warned Cortez to change his behavior and threatened him with more
severe discipline, the court held that such counseling is sufficient only as
a first resort.82 If the harassment continues, Title VII requires more se-
vere discipline.83 Judge Hall rejected the VA's argument that the duty to
take remedial action did not arise until the E.E.O.C. counselor concluded
that sexual harassment had occurred.8" The district court's finding that
the sexual harassment began in April 1987 precluded the VA's argument
since the VA knew of Cortez' conduct at that time.85
Judge Hall then considered the VA's remedial actions and concluded
that the VA had not met the duty enunciated in Ellison .86 According to
Judge Hall, Ellison required an employer's remedy to be disciplinary. 7
Additionally, Judge Hall adopted four factors for determining the appro-
priateness of the remedy: (1) the seriousness of the harassment; (2) the
employer's ability to stop the harasser; (3) the likelihood of the remedy
80. Id. at 777-79. The court applied the three-part retroactivity standard of Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971). To satisfy Chevron, a court must show: (I) that the standard
sought to be applied retroactively does not announce a new rule of law; (2) that retroactive applica-
tion will further the standard's operation; and, (3) that the standard's retroactive application will not
produce inequitable results. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-107.
The VA argued that Ellison announced a new rule of law because Ellison required discipline
beyond a simple request to stop. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that Ellison was foreshadowed
by E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989), which held that an employer is liable
if he fails to remedy the harassment. 973 F.2d at 778. The court quickly disposed of the other two
requirements and concluded that Ellison applied retroactively. Id. at 779.
81. 973 F.2d at 779.
82. Id. at 780.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 779.
85. Id.
86. 973 F.2d at 779.
87. Id. Judge Hall relied on the statement in Ellison that "[e]mployers send the wrong message
to potential harassers when they fail to discipline employees for sexual harassment." Id. (quoting
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882). Judge Hall further stated that "[i]f the employer Tail[s] to take even the
mildest form of disciplinary action' the remedy is insufficient under Title VII." 973 F.2d at 779
(quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882).
In determing the retroactivity of Ellison, Judge Hall interpreted the phrase "appropriate correc-
tive action" in the E.E.O.C. Guidelines "to require some form, however mild, of disciplinary meas-
ures." Id. at 778 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(d)). Judge Hall argued that because discipline is more
likely to reduce the chance of repeat offenses discipline is "corrective" within the meaning of the
Guidelines.
Judge Keep, in her concurrence, disagreed with Judge Hall to the extent that Judge Hall inter-
preted Ellison to require punitive rather than remedial measures. 972 F.2d at 781. See also infra
note 96.
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ending the harassment; and, (4) the remedy's ability to deter future har-
assment. 8 Judge Hall then tempered her argument 9 by rejecting the
plaintiff's argument that counseling can never be "disciplinary."9  Ac-
cording to Judge Hall, counseling is sufficient if it ends the harassment. 9'
However, once an employer learns that the counseling has not ended the
harassment, the employer must take more severe disciplinary measures.92
Judge Keep's concurrence agreed with Judge Hall's opinion that the
VA's response to Intlekofer's complaints was inappropriate.93 However,
Judge Keep wrote separately to distance herself from Judge Hall's am-
biguous suggestion that Title VII requires discipline.94 According to
Judge Keep, Judge Hall's definition of 'discipline' did not clarify whether
punishment is required after the first finding of harassment.95 Judge
Keep's concurring opinion emphasized the remedial rather than punitive
purpose of Title VII.96 Judge Keep refused to hold that Title VII always
88. Id. at 779 (citing Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882).
89. Judge Hall may have thought it necessary to soften her earlier language on discipline be-
cause Judge Keep had written separately to emphasize that Title VII does not require punitive meas-
ures. See id. at 780 n.8.
90. Id. at 779. Judge Hall explained that "[a]t the first sign of sexual harassment, an oral
warning in the context of a counseling session may be an appropriate disciplinary measure if the
employer expresses strong disapproval, demands that the unwelcome conduct cease, and threatens
more severe disciplinary action in the event that the conduct does not cease." Id. at 779-80.
91. 973 F.2d at 780.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 781 (Keep, J., concurring).
94. See supra note 87. Judge Keep argued that Ellison was consistent with the remedial pur-
poses of Title VII but did not create an absolute rule requiring punitive measures.
95. 973 F.2d at 781 (Keep, J., concurring). Although Judge Hall's opinion stated that remedial
actions must be disciplinary, the opinion cited cases holding that an employer's verbal warning was
sufficient. See id. at 777 (citing Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987); Barret v.
Omaha Nat'l. Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984)). See also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968
F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993) ("Title VII does not require that an
employer use the most serious sanction available to punish an offender, particularly where, as here,
this was the first documented offense by an individual employee."). In Landgraf, the employer
reprimanded the harasser after the first complaint. Though the harassment continued, the plaintiff
did not report the subsequent incidents. The Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's determination
that the employer took steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Id. at 430, 433. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Langraff to determine whether the 1991 Amendments
to the Civil Rights Act allowing compensation and punitive damages in Title VII cases applies retro-
actively to cases pending when the amendments were enacted. Landgraf, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993).
96. 973 F.2d at 782. Judge Keep relied on Supreme Court cases interpreting Title VII as a
"remedial" statute. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986); Transworld Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Firefighters Local Union v. Scotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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requires disciplinary measures.97
Judge Wiggins dissented. Unlike his colleagues, Judge Wiggins con-
sidered whether sexual harassment had actually occurred.98 He argued
that when the consensual sexual relationship between Intlekofer and
Cortez ended, hard feelings existed on both sides and harsh words were
exchanged. 99
According to Judge Wiggins, the VA acted reasonably to diffuse the
difficult situation resulting from a relationship gone sour. t°" The VA de-
moted Cortez to the mail room, told him not to talk to Intlekofer, and
separated their work schedules as much as possible.1
Judge Wiggins also agreed with Judge Keep that Title VII does not
always require punitive measures. 10 2  He feared that requiring punish-
ment would impose strict liability on employers who do not recognize
harassment immediately. 0 3 Employers would be inclined to punish all
accused harassers, regardless of guilt, exposing the employer to liability
from the accused harasser. 1° 4
III. THE IMPACT OF INTLEKOFER
Intlekofer sends employers the message that courts are less willing to
defer to their judgement when it comes to responding to a sexual harass-
ment claim.'0 5 The Intlekofer decision is flawed for six reasons because
97. 973 F.2d at 783 (Keep, J., concurring). Unlike Judge Hall, Judge Keep did not conclude
that disciplinary measures are always more likely to put an end to the harassment. Id.
98. Id. at 783 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Judge Wiggins argued that "[w]hile this court may be
required to find that there was in fact sexual harassment because the VA did not appeal the finding, I
nevertheless believe that an employer has no duty to remedy nonexistent harassment" Id.
Judge Wiggins argued that Cortez' conduct did not meet the E.E.O.C. definition of sexual harass-
ment because the conduct did not "constitute a sexual advance, request a sexual favor, or constitute
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. at 784. The Ninth Circuit had never declared
that individual conflicts between members of the opposite sex constituted sexual harassment. Id.
Only Intlekofer's first complaint of "touching" approached the definition of sexual harassment, and
Judge Wiggins questioned the complaint's veracity because Intlekofer refused to elaborate on the
incident. 973 F.2d at 784 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 785. Cortez testified that Intlekofer, who was in charge of work assignments, sched-
uled Cortez for the most undesirable hours. After their break-up, Cortez alleged that Intlekofer
threatened "that he would never be able to ignore her." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Intlekofer testified that it would have been impossible to totally separate their work
schedules. Id.
102. Id. at 786.
103. 973 F.2d at 786 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Judge Wiggins' dissent argued that the court should give the employer some deference in
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it: (1) imposes an impossible 20-20 hindsight standard on employers; (2)
requires employers to play a role in educating employees about values;
(3) emphasizes discipline over fairness; (4) leaves open the question of
from whose perspective to measure the disciplinary measures; (5) may
stifle attempts at alternative dispute resolution; and, (6) fails to recognize
the presence of legitimate sexual contact in the workplace. Although
courts have cautioned against requiring perfect 20-20 hindsight in sexual
harassment cases, the Ninth Circuit in Intlekofer did just that. 0 6
Although the Intlekofer test is worded loosely enough to sound prospec-
tive, the test is actually backwards-looking because it focuses on results
rather than objectives.
Recently, courts have taken an active role in requiring employers to
implement policies that not only punish wrongdoers and enable victims
to voice their complaints, but also make the employer responsible for
educating and sensitizing employees to the standard of appropriate be-
havior.'0 7 Proponents of the reasonable woman standard argue that it
responding to individual circumstances because the definition of sexual harassment is constantly
evolving. Id. at 786 n.2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Cf, Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix, 828 F.2d
307 (5th Cir. 1987). In Dornhecker an employee complained of sexual harassment while on a busi-
ness trip. The employer assured the victim that she would never have to work with the harasser
again after the trip ended in two more days. Id. at 308. The court deferred to the employer's
judgment and found that the employer's response was appropriate under the circumstances. Id. at
309.
106. Comisky, supra note 61, at 199.
107. The recent Florida district court case of Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), demonstrates a willingness among courts to ensure that employers institute
sexual harassment policies aimed at eliminating the threat. In Robinson, the plaintiff was subjected
to a male-dominated work environment filled with graphic pin-ups, calendars, and posters depicting
nude and scantily clothed women. Id. at 1493. The offensive material was pervasive and openly
displayed in common work areas with the knowledge of management. Id. at 1494. The Robinson
court heard and accepted expert testimony explaining the detrimental effects of sexual stereotyping
on the workplace and linking the sexually explicit pin-ups to the abusive and demeaning attitudes of
the other workers. Id. at 1504. The court found that a reasonable woman would have considered
this environment hostile in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1524.
The Robinson court did more than expand hostile environment sexual harassment to include por-
nography in the workplace. The court ordered the defendant to adopt a comprehensive sexual har-
assment policy which had been substantially drafted by the plaintiff's counsel, the National
Organization of Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund. 760 F. Supp. at 1537. The policy
included a specific schedule of penalties graduated by the offense and the harasser's status. Id. at
1543. See generally, Dana S. Connell, Effective Sexual Harassment Policies: Unexpected Lessons
from Jacksonville Shipyards, 17 EMP. REL. L. J. 191 (1991).
Nevertheless, courts give more weight to a company's actions than to the company's established
policy. In Kaufman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit found that
an employer's response was adequate even though none of the employees knew the company had a
sexual harassment policy. Although the employer did not have formal procedures for handling sex-
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sensitizes employees while ensuring that employers will not have to dis-
miss employees because of individual personality conflicts.1 "8 Intlekofer
challenges the proponents' argument. Intlekofer's message to employers
is when in doubt, treat the behavior as sexual harassment and discipline
the harasser accordingly.
Judge Hall's suggestion that Title VII requires some form of discipline
raises the issue of from whose perspective the disciplinary measures
should be judged. The Ninth Circuit in Ellison held that the proper stan-
dard for measuring the employer's remedial response should not be what
a "reasonable employer" would do1" because a reasonable employer
might not severely discipline a valued employee. Yet measuring the pro-
posed discipline from the victim's perspective, like the threshold question
of whether sexual harassment has occurred, is also unsatisfactory. Sup-
pose an employer transfers an alleged harasser to a location that the har-
asser finds less satisfactory, but that the victim views as a promotion. If
the employer's response is measured from the victim's perspective, the
victim would still have a Title VII claim, even if the harassment ended,
because from the victim's perspective, the harasser is being rewarded.
Another problem in the Intlekofer decision, which the dissent ad-
dressed, 110 is that Judge Hall's dicta may encourage some employers to
discipline first and ask questions later. However, employers that disci-
pline first and ask questions later may be liable to the accused
harasser. I 1
Intlekofer may also discourage employers from allowing employees to
ual harassment complaints, the employer shielded itself from liability by immediately terminating
the alleged harasser. Id. at 184.
108. See Hahn, supra note 50, at 91.
109. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 n.17.
110. 973 F.2d at 786 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
111. See generally, Comisky, supra note 61, at 195-201. Alleged harassers have brought numer-
ous suits, though not always successfully, on the following grounds:
Defamation: Garziano v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a qualified privilege applied to employee statements concerning alleged har-
asser); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating that a
qualified privilege protects statements made during bona fide investigation); Stockley v.
AT&T, 687 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) (same); Gonzalez v. CNA Ins. Co., 717 F.
Supp. 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (allowing a claim for defamation); Oetzman v. Ahrens, 427
N.W.2d 421 (Wis.App. 1988) (finding for an employee in a defamation claim against union
representative);
Employment Discrimination: Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir.
1991) (age discrimination claim unsuccessful); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683
F. Supp. 596, 627-28 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (finding that an employee discharged for sexual
harassment was discriminated against on the basis of national origin); Marsh v. Digital
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pursue alternative means of dispute resolution. Mediation, for example,
has become a popular means for employees to resolve their complaints
about sexual behavior at work. 112 After Intlekofer, an employer may
fear liability if the mediation does not immediately end the objectionable
behavior.
Finally, Intlekofer does not offer employers any guidance on the larger
question of how to respond to sexual relations between employees who
are co-workers. 113 With more women in the workforce than ever before,
many people have found the workplace to be a valuable source of new
relationships. Although the goal of Title VII is not a sterile, de-sexual-
ized workplace,' 1 4 Intlekofer may encourage employers to develop poli-
Equip. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Ariz. 1987) (finding for an employee in a claim that a
discharge for sexual harassment was merely a pretext for race discrimination);
Wrongful Discharge: Williams v. Maremount Corp., 875 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1989)
(unsuccessful claim); Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(successful claim); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1109 (same);
Breach of Contract: Anderson v. Hewlett-Pacckard Corp., 694 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D.
Ohio 1988) (unsuccessful).
Additionally, after Robinson, supra note 109, in which the court found a hostile environment be-
cause of the pervasive use of pornography, sexually explicit pin-ups and calendars, and off color
jokes and language in the workplace, commentators raised First Amendment questions. See Kings-
ley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the First Amendment,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 501-09 (1991) (arguing that hostile environment sexual harassment law has a
chilling effect on speech); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 1791 (1992); Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual
Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 448
(1991) (arguing that the Robinson analysis is limited to traditionally male-dominated jobs).
For guidance in developing preventive procedures for investigating sexual harassment charges, see
Cheryl Blackwell Bryson, The Internal Sexual Harassment Investigation. Self-evaluation without
Self-incrimination, 15 EMP. REL. L.J. 551 (1990).
112. See Howard Gadlin, Careful Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment, 7 NEGOTIATION J.
139 (1991); Mary P. Rowe, People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System with both Formal
and Informal Options, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 161 (1990).
113. As Ellison and Intlekofer demonstrate, sexual harassment is possible at both ends of the
relationship. An employee's pathetic attempts to "woo" a co-employee may be perceived by a rea-
sonable woman as sexual harassment. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. Or, as in Intlekofer, the break-up of
a workplace relationship may lead to charges of sexual harassment. See Chamallas, supra note 1, at
857 n.303 (observing that "[in addition to disrupting normal working patterns, employers find that
,one of the more threatening aspects of the breakup of an affair is that the incident can degenerate
into charges of sexual harassment.' ") (quoting L. WETHoFF, CORPORATE ROMANCE 103 (1985)).
Distinguishing between sexual harassment and legitimate sexual relations can be difficult for employ-
ers. See Paul, supra note 1, at 357-58.
114. See Gedrose, supra note 37, at 161; E.E.O.C. Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615 3114, at
3267 (1990).
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cies prohibiting sexual relationships between employees rather than risk
liability.115
CONCLUSION
Even though Intlekofer's holding is limited to its facts, the ruling
sends employers the message that courts are less willing to defer to their
decisions on how to discipline sexual harassers. The full ramifications of
Intlekofer may not be seen until employers, faced with an increasing
number of suits from disciplined harassers, seek to limit sexual freedom
among co-employees.
Thomas D. Brown
115. E.g., Margaret Mead, A Proposal. We Need Taboos on Sex at Work, in D. Neugarten & L
Shafritz eds. SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 54
(1980) (reprinted from REDBOOK MAGAZINE April 1978). Margaret Mead suggests that sexual
harassment will not end until there are taboos on sexual relationships between employees. Contra
Chamallas, supra note 1, at 857 n.306. Chamallas argues that Mead's proposal unnecessarily stifles
sexual freedom at work.
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